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Abstract 
International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying differentiated 
commitments that may, in turn, affect negotiation dynamics. Drawing on incentive-based and socialization 
arguments, we develop a “constructed peer group” hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups those 
organizations may actually construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based 
disagreements existing between countries. This generates a particular type of path dependence, rendering 
broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.  
We analyze this question at the example of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 
increasingly politicized split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Using a self-coded dataset of country 
oral statements during the negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess whether Annex 
I membership influences a country’s stance towards other countries’ arguments, while controlling for country 
characteristics that may drive their preferences and the affiliation to Annex I. We find that the split between 
Annex I and non-Annex I has indeed influenced negotiation behavior and amplified the divide between 
developing and industrialized countries in the climate negotiations. 
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Constructed Peer Groups and Path Dependence in International Organizations: 
The Case of the International Climate Change Negotiations 
 
1. Introduction 
A large body of research tries to answer why some intergovernmental organizations are 
effective in terms of achieving their stated goals while others are not (Breitmeier et al., 2011; 
Levy, 1996; Miles, 2002; Mitchell, 2002, 2006; Underdal and Young, 2004; Vollenweider, 
2012; Weiss and Jacobson, 1998; Wettestad, 1997; Young, 1992, 1999a). Several studies 
also examine the role of intergovernmental organizations in their member states’ 
socialization with particular norms and roles. A Special Issue in International Organization, 
for example, analyses how the European institutions affect member states’ interests and 
behavior (Checkel, 2005a). Pevehouse (2002) assesses effects of membership to 
intergovernmental organizations on democracy levels of members. Bearce and Bondanella 
(2007) investigate whether common membership to intergovernmental organizations leads to 
interest convergence between members. Greenhill (2010) looks at the effect of membership 
on human rights practices of states.  
When it comes to the assessment of more specific institutional features of the individual 
intergovernmental organizations, and their effect on bargaining and cooperation within them, 
the number of studies becomes more limited. Some studies examine the effect of specific 
voting rules or the role of the chair of a negotiation (Odell, 2005; Susskind, 1994; Tallberg, 
2006). A few others have considered differentiated rules for different countries, an 
institutional clause frequently used especially in multilateral environmental agreements. 
These studies are most closely related to our study and will thus be discussed further below. 
Crucially, this research has so far relied mostly on single or few case studies to draw 
inferences, so that virtually no systematic empirical research has been done on how initial 
institutional provisions affect member states’ future cooperation within multilateral 
agreements, and hence the dynamics of the multilateral negotiation process over time.  
This is quite surprising as the theoretical institutionalist literature has long argued that the 
design of intergovernmental organizations affects their ability to promote cooperation 
(Keohane et al., 1993; Peterson, 1997). There is a broader literature on the effect of treaty 
design on bilateral bargaining, cooperation and conflict over shared resources, for instance in 
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the area of water-related agreements (e.g. Fischhendler, 2008a, 2008b; Tir and Stinnett, 
2012). But again, this literature primarily focuses on questions of implementation and 
compliance rather than effects on the future dynamics of the negotiation process itself. 
In this article, we consider the effect of particular features of institutional design on future 
bargaining behavior by member states within an intergovernmental organization, and 
thereby, on the organizations’s future development. We consider that the way in which such 
an agreement is designed may affect state interests and behavior, even if this was not 
intended in the first place. In other words, we do not assess whether certain institutional 
features effectively serve the purpose they were designed for. Rather, we consider the 
structural side-effects of institutional design. This will be assessed at the example of the 
negotiations under the United Nations Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
The choice of the UNFCCC is motivated by existing anecdotal evidences. The initial 
agreement led to the Convention’s so-called ‘Annex I’ listing a number of OECD and 
transition countries as a means of differentiating them from ‘non-Annex I’ countries with 
respect to their greenhouse gas reduction and reporting commitments. Reportedly, this 
distinction has become more and more politicized and rigid over time and created an 
unintended and unnecessarily deep divide between the two groups of countries (Baumert et 
al., 1999; Baumert et al., 2002; Gupta, 2010; Höhne, 2005, p. 37). Analysts of the UNFCCC 
process have indeed described the creation of the Annex I / non-Annex I division of the 
world as “amateurish” (Gupta, 2010, p. 641), and the related North-South dynamics as 
“dysfunctional” and “the regime’s greatest weakness” (Depledge and Yamin, 2009, p. 443). 
Legal scholars have examined such country differentiation in intergovernmental 
organizations from a normative perspective (for example Rajamani, 2000, 2006). Political 
scientists have discussed the relevance of such – or similar – flexibility provisions for regime 
effectiveness (Andresen and Wettestad, 1992; Fischhendler, 2008a, 2008b; Koremenos et al., 
2001; Kucik and Reinhardt, 2008). However, the analysis of the effects of such 
differentiation on the future negotiation process is at least equally relevant. As noted by John 
Odell in a recent review of the negotiations literature, there is a general lack of research 
combining the insights of macro conditions and micro processes of negotiation. He thus 
explicitly calls for the introduction of “hypotheses about how international institutional 
differences (as conceived by either rationalists or constructivists) affect individual negotiator 
behavior” (Odell, 2013, p. 40).  
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We respond to this call by drawing from both, institutionalism and negotiation research, and 
propose a “constructed peer group” hypothesis, whereby the “constructed” peer group is 
itself an institution created within an intergovernmental organization. Our hypothesis 
suggests that once these groups are constructed and institutionalized, negotiation behavior of 
countries that are party to the agreement may follow the delimiting lines between these 
groups. We expect that the group building process itself alters the countries’ incentives, and, 
as a consequence, their negotiation behavior. For instance, countries in groupings initially 
granted certain exemptions from economic or environmental obligations will have an 
incentive to lobby for the continuation of this preferential treatment in subsequent 
negotiation rounds. In addition, creating such country groupings may imply increased 
discussions within these groups and thereby enhance mutual understanding and support, 
leading to socialization effects. Eventually, the decision to form specific country groups may 
drive the discussions in a different direction than they would have taken otherwise and 
render future broad-based international agreements even more difficult. If this is the case, 
then more attention needs to be paid to these aspects of regime design right from the 
beginning. 
Empirically, we assess to what extent the ex-ante categorization of member countries to the 
UNFCCC may indeed have amplified the divide between them. The empirical challenge is to 
differentiate between the effect of institutionalized groupings and the impact of policy 
preferences that can be explained by different country characteristics. To do so, we examine 
the factors leading countries to openly express support for other countries’ positions during 
the UNFCCC negotiations from December 2007 to December 2009. Based on summaries of 
the negotiations published in the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), we code all statements 
by countries declaring support for other countries’ previous interventions. We then assess the 
impact of Annex I membership and various country characteristics on this variable in a 
multivariate censored regression framework. We complement this analysis with propensity 
score matching, which allows us to relax the functional form assumptions and to limit our 
comparison to actually comparable countries – thereby eliminating a potentially important 
source of bias.  
In the following, we first describe how differential treatment has been implemented in other 
intergovernmental organizations, and propose a theoretical framework describing our 
“constructed peer group” hypothesis linking it to existing incentive-based and sociological 
arguments from the literature. Then we describe how this discussion applies to the particular 
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case of the UNFCCC. After explaining the data and our empirical estimation approach, we 
present the results, conclusions, potential policy implications, and ways forward in research. 
 
2. Theory and literature  
2.1 Differential treatment of parties to multilateral environmental agreements 
The UNFCCC is not the only intergovernmental organization that has adopted differentiated 
rules for groups of countries. In fact, several other multilateral environmental agreements, 
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1983 International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1994 United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, have incorporated the notion of 
differentiated responsibility of states with respect to the protection of the environment, based 
on the recognition already in Principles 6 and 7 of the Rio Declaration (UN, 1992), of the 
future development needs of poor countries, of other special needs and circumstances of 
countries, and of the different contribution of countries to the specific environmental 
problem at hand. The resulting differential treatment usually consists of less stringent 
obligations, different timing of the application of provisions, and international assistance in 
terms of financing, capacity building or technology transfer (Hepburn and Ahmad, 2005; 
Matsui, 2002).  
Beyond the environmental domain, the World Trade Organization also has “Special and 
Differential Treatment” provisions, which are based on the notion that countries at different 
levels of development have different trade policy needs (Page and Kleen, 2005). The 1979 
Enabling Clause formally established differential treatment for developing countries and, 
among them, for Least Developed Countries. In recent negotiation rounds on specific trade 
areas, depending on different criteria, various sub-groups of developing countries have been 
granted preferential treatment. In this context, it has been noted that the existing country 
categories have become rigid and are being considered as negotiation goals themselves. As a 
result, akin to the situation under the UNFCCC, there has been a discussion about how to 
make the differential treatment more dynamic and how to establish differentiation categories 
and graduation rules to allow this flexibility (see e.g. Hoekman et al., 2004; Hoekman and 
Özden, 2006; Kasteng et al., 2004; Page and Kleen, 2005).  
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It is thus clear that differential treatment provisions have become a relatively common 
feature of intergovernmental organizations. However, the extent of their rigidity varies 
across agreements (see Rajamani 2006, p. 119 for a first classification of multilateral 
environmental agreements along these lines). The UNFCCC is the sole example where 
country groups are fixed independently of any changeably characteristics. Even membership 
in the group of least developed countries can change over time, whereas the list of Annex I 
countries has no link to any criteria of income, growth, or whatsoever. It thus represents an 
extreme case, but, at the same time, a unique opportunity for empirical analysis: Only when 
country groupings are not directly linked to country characteristics, a clean distinction 
between the effects of the two can be made. 
Before we get to the empirical part, however, we explain our theoretical understanding of 
why and how differential treatment could have an effect on future bargaining and 
cooperation. 
 
2.2. A theory of why institutionalized groupings could affect the future negotiation process: 
the constructed peer group hypothesis 
Clearly, countries’ characteristics and related preferences affect the positions they take up 
and express in multilateral negotiations, the statements they approve of, and, eventually, the 
outcomes of the negotiation process. Countries within distinct groups usually share some 
economic, political or geographical characteristics, and these similarities lead to common 
positions on certain policy issues at stake.  
However, as suggested by institutionalist theory, over and above the effect of similarities in 
country characteristics and related preferences, the existence of institutionalized country 
groupings may have an effect of its own. We call this the “constructed peer group” 
hypothesis. The construction of such groups by the regime itself (in contrast to country 
coalitions formed voluntarily to defend common positions) results in new commonalities 
among their member countries, which lead on the one hand to new incentives to “fight” for 
common goals, and on the other to a group identity similar to that of a peer group. This in 
turn affects the negotiation dynamics, and leads eventually to the persistence of these 
constructed groups, even for other purposes than those intended initially. We thus expect 
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path dependence between initial institutional decisions and later negotiation structures and 
dynamics.  
We consider two arguments that back up our hypothesis: (i) new incentives created by the 
new groups, and (ii) socialization and group psychology. Note that we do not seek to assess 
the relative importance of these arguments. Our data does not allow us to test them 
individually. Rather, we consider that they can both motivate our constructed peer-group 
hypothesis, and it may well be that both are similarly relevant for the phenomenon at hand.  
 
2.2.1  New incentives 
New incentives are generated when group formation goes hand in hand with specific 
privileges attached to group membership. For all group members, the protection of these 
privileges becomes a new and common objective. For instance, groupings initially granted 
exemptions from economic or environmental obligations have an incentive to jointly lobby 
for the continuation of this preferential treatment in subsequent negotiation rounds, or for the 
expansion of the preferential treatment to other issue areas. Countries in the group with 
financial or environmental obligations will in turn lobby for the abolishment of the 
preferential treatment, or for increased flexibility for fulfilling their commitments. In both 
cases, the common objective strengthens group cohesion.  
 
2.2.2  Socialization and group psychology 
Countries in a given group will likely meet more often and exchange positions. The reduced 
number of participants facilitates the creation of personal relationships between country 
representatives and the emergence of social capital (Coleman, 1990; Schimmelfennig et al., 
2006). Researchers of intergovernmental organizations have adopted these arguments for 
explaining strengthening ties between all their members. They argue that membership of 
such organizations creates networks between countries, promotes sharing of information 
about interests and intentions, and generate a sense of mutual identity that leads to 
cooperation (Caporaso, 1992; Dorussen and Ward, 2008; Keohane, 1986; Russett et al., 
1998; Young, 1999b). The institutional socialization hypothesis further suggests that 
intergovernmental organizations, by means of formal and informal exchange at meetings, 
 8 
make member states internalize new norms and rules that are accepted within that 
organization, affecting their identity over time, thus making their interests converge (Bearce 
and Bondanella, 2007; Checkel, 1999; Johnston, 2001).  
We posit that this should not only happen within an intergovernmental organization as a 
whole, but even more so within smaller subgroups. The smaller the group and the clearer the 
similarities of members’ preferences at the outset, the stronger should be these effects 
(Mantzavinos et al., 2004; Olson, 1971). Once a group exists, this reinforces cohesion 
among its members, and a unified group position is likely to emerge.   
Arguably, these psychological and sociological arguments rather apply to individuals than to 
countries, as pointed out by Johnston (2001, p. 506-507). However, a relevant part of 
country delegations remains stable over a certain number of years (see for example 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2012). These delegates sit together in the different subgroups 
shaping their ideas and their statements on behalf of their countries. We will focus on these 
statements, and thus the micro-level underpinnings of negotiation theory, in the empirical 
part of this article. 
 
2.2.3 The result: Deepening of group divisions and institutional path dependence 
Both arguments presented above support the hypothesis that, once new country groupings 
have been institutionalized within an intergovernmental organization, negotiation behavior 
of parties will make such groups increasingly pervasive in the discussions, deepening the 
differences and disagreements across groups. Eventually, the decision to form specific 
country groups may drive the discussions in a different direction than they would have taken 
otherwise and render broad-based international agreements even more difficult. These results 
concur with North’s theories on institutional path dependence (1990), and with Pierson’s 
argument that “Established institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce their 
own stability and further development” (2000, p. 255).  
Theoretically, the two effects described should lead to a closeness of group members that 
goes beyond the ties generated by similar country characteristics and related preferences. 
Empirically, however, neither of the two effects is easily assessed. As long as group building 
only generates stronger cohesion among countries anyway linked by homogeneous 
preferences, the impact of the group itself will be difficult to identify. When a group is 
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constructed artificially, its members are not necessarily as homogeneous in their preferences. 
In this case, identification of the group effect becomes possible without tracking its members 
over time.  
The relevance of assessing this potential effect of constructed peer groups lies in the fact that 
they are designed and decided upon within the international agreement. This implies that 
their effect can be avoided, if desired, by alternative institutional designs. While setting up 
such groups may help initially to find consensus on the agreement, this should be balanced 
against potential disadvantages in the further course of the negotiations. For that purpose, 
their side-effects need to be properly assessed. 
 
3. Differential treatment under the UNFCCC  
 “Why shouldn’t I date an Annex I guy?” asked Leela Raina in an article written during the 
UN climate negotiations in Bangkok (Raina, 2009). The Indian climate activist lists a couple 
of reasons: Annex I guys are not willing to commit, they usually take more space in the 
relationship, they refuse to finance dinners, they are possessive and want daily records, and 
they have a consumption-oriented lifestyle. With her article, Raina neatly captures a deep 
divide between developed and developing countries in international climate policy, which 
was not foreseen when the UNFCCC was agreed upon.  
The ultimate goal of the UNFCCC is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 2). To this aim, all parties commit to publish 
greenhouse gas inventories and their national climate-related policies and measures, and to 
cooperate in technology, greenhouse gas sinks management, adaptation, research and 
education (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 4.1). 
In addition, the Convention stipulates additional efforts for those countries which, in 1992, 
were recognized as historically responsible for most of the emissions and wealthy enough to 
bear the mitigation costs. Accordingly, the Convention’s first guiding principle is “common 
but differentiated responsibilities”: “[…] the developed country Parties should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof” (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 3.1). 
The developed countries supposed to take the lead – the then OECD members plus selected 
countries of the former Soviet Union – were listed in Annex I of the Convention.  
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Article 4.2 of the Convention defines the objective of returning CO2 emissions of Annex I 
countries to 1990 levels by 2000. The Kyoto Protocol in 1997 led to additional binding 
targets for a list of countries that widely corresponds to UNFCCC, Annex I (Annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol). A subset of Annex I countries further agreed to provide climate-related 
financial support to developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 4.3). Clearly, membership to 
Annex I is tied to costly emission reduction and financial commitments, while membership 
to ‘non-Annex I’ is linked to financial, technical and capacity building support, and to 
potential financial transfers through the carbon market and climate finance.  
While some procedural mechanisms for regular revisions of Annex I were foreseen within 
the Convention, there was no in-built graduation principle. Correspondingly, there has been 
little change over time. A few European countries joined Annex I in 1997 when they joined 
the Convention: the Czech Republic and Slovakia (replacing Czechoslovakia), as well as 
Croatia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Slovenia (UNFCCC, 2000). More recently, Malta and 
Cyprus joined Annex I when they accessed the European Union. Otherwise, changes of the 
country list in Annex I have proven to be extremely contentious. Except for Malta and 
Cyprus, no move between non-Annex I and Annex I has taken place so far. In 1998 
Argentina and Kazakhstan proposed to take up emission targets (thereby joining Annex I), 
but this was prevented through the fierce opposition of other developing countries, which 
feared that this would generate a precedent eventually leading to commitments for 
developing countries (Grubb et al., 1999, p. 251-252). In 2006, Belarus, being an Annex I 
party to the UNFCCC, requested an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to be included in its 
Annex B with an emissions reduction target. So far, this amendment has not entered into 
force as the number of parties ratifying it has not been sufficiently high (UNFCCC, 2013). 
The distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries has become increasingly rigid 
and extended to more and more contentious issues (Höhne, 2005, p. 37; Höhne et al., 1997, 
p. 9). In the words of Gupta (2010, p. 641), “the division of the world into developed and 
developing (based on OECD membership) was amateurish—there were no clear criteria for 
this division, and this has proved to be a major stumbling block in subsequent periods as 
countries resisted their inclusion in Annex I (e.g., Turkey) or are reluctant to change their 
status subsequently.”  
Thus, initially, listing countries in Annex I was meant to be used only as an interim vehicle 
to differentiate the emission reduction and related reporting commitments. However, in 
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practice it may have created a lasting divide between two static country groups. Such a 
lasting divide can be regarded as a largely unintended consequence of institutional design 
with an impact on regime effectiveness: in the early 1990s, nobody could foresee how the 
emission paths of different countries would evolve (see e.g. Levine and Aden, 2008, 
showing the stark changes in subsequent forecasts of future emission levels for China), how 
critical addressing these emissions would become for the effectiveness of the regime 20 
years onwards, and how difficult it would be to do so due to the institutionalized separation 
of commitments by Annex I and non-Annex I parties. 
The increasing rigidity can plausibly be explained by the “new incentives” and the 
“socialization and group psychology” effects outlined above. Within the UNFCCC, the 
creation of the Annex I - non-Annex I distinction generated new incentives because 
membership in Annex I was linked to costly responsibilities and duties, while non-
membership was linked to privileges. For non-Annex I members, this created new stakes, the 
idea that concessions once obtained should not be weakened, and thus the incentive to fight 
for the perpetuation of the status quo (Gupta, 2010). This fight takes place by the group as a 
whole since, in their view, any weakening of the once-defined dividing line between 
countries with and without commitments will pave the way for further pressure with respect 
to more and more countries taking up commitments, and eventually, for a suppression of the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Corfee-Morlot and Hohne, 2003; 
Grubb et al., 1999, p. 107-111). At the same time Leela Raina’s reasons “not to date an 
Annex I guy” quoted above show the psychological and ideological divide that has emerged 
between the two groups. 
 
4. Data and variables 
In order to test whether Annex I membership plays a role – over and above country 
characteristics and preferences – for countries’ negotiation behavior, we need to define our 
understanding of “negotiation behavior” and the relevant country characteristics. 
Negotiation behavior encompasses many different aspects of deliberation and strategic 
action in the negotiations. To handle the concept in our empirical analysis we narrow it down 
to one measurable dimension: the number of oral statements by countries declaring support 
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to other countries’ previous statements. We assume that openly expressing support for a 
country’s previous statements indicates closeness in terms of negotiation positions.  
To generate this variable, we hand-code the negotiation reports published in the ENBs for 
the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and intersessional negotiation meetings 
from December 2007 to December 2009 (IISD, 2007-2009). This time period encompasses a 
crucial stage of the climate negotiations, which included bargaining on both a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and a further agreement that would include 
new provisions on mitigation, adaptation, finance, capacity building and technology transfer, 
with a view on reaching agreement by December 2009 in Copenhagen. This period thus 
allows us to include deliberations on a broad range of issue areas in the analysis, which is 
important to ensure that our general measure of support is not distorted by the specific 
selection of topics under discussion.  
Our coding covers 85 days of negotiation from Bali 2007 to Copenhagen 2009, and 173 
participating countries. We aggregate the information on statements on all these conference 
days into a single observation per country. Formally, if we define zijt as the variable that 
counts the instances in which country i makes a statement in support of country j’s position 
during negotiation day t, and nj as the total number of statements by country j during the 
negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009, we can express our dependent 
variables, the percentage of supportive statements, as: 
 
100⋅=
∑
j
i
ijt
ij n
z
y  ,  i=1,…,173   j=1,…,9 t=1,…,85      (1) 
 
We generate such dependent variables for nine distinct countries and coalitions. The 
restriction to such a selection is due to the immense data collection effort that would have 
been necessary if all countries and coalitions had been included on both dimensions. 
Moreover, as many countries do not speak up much, variation in our final variable would 
have been low due to multiple zeros. We thus prefer a careful selection of countries and 
coalitions that are among the most active in the negotiations and simultaneously represent a 
wide variety of positions. This makes our coding more reliable than for countries that do not 
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intervene much in plenary and still ensures that all relevant perspectives are taken into 
account. These nine countries and coalitions are: the EU, the US and Russia, who are among 
the major Annex I actors; Tuvalu, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the 
African Group, who represent ambitious developing countries with low emissions but high 
climate vulnerability; China and India, who are among the most active emerging economies 
in the UNFCCC; and Saudi Arabia, who as an oil-exporting economy represents special 
interests within the non-Annex I group. Russia, the US and, above all, Saudi Arabia are 
known as laggards, while the EU tries to portray itself as a climate frontrunner. Further 
information about how the statements were coded can be found in the Supplementary 
Material. Table A1, also in the Supplementary Material, lists the 25 countries and coalitions 
that were most active in the negotiations in the period of analysis, highlighting the ones that 
were chosen for this study. 
We treat the information obtained as nine different dependent variables. We thus perform 
separate regressions on how frequently each of these countries/coalitions has been supported 
by all the other countries participating in the negotiations. 
One of the limitations of the dataset is that it only covers the negotiation meetings that are 
open to external observers. Our analysis works only under the assumption that the behavior 
of parties in the open negotiations represents their behavior in all meetings. We believe that 
this assumption is plausible. Open meetings include both plenaries (used mostly to take 
procedural and formal decisions) and contact groups (issue-specific technical negotiation 
groups) (Depledge, 2005, p. 104-122). While the real negotiations do not take place in the 
plenaries, our dataset does include reports of bargaining during technical contact group 
meetings. In addition, as the plenaries are generally used to either introduce the topics that 
will be discussed during the following week, or to summarize and debate the progress made 
during the past negotiation days, positions observed in these meetings should not deviate 
substantially from the ones expressed behind closed doors. Finally, our variable of interest is 
not the country position per se, but relational behavior in terms of support for other parties’ 
expressed positions, in which case strategic behavior (such as adopting the winning position 
to portrait oneself as successful) should be less of a concern. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for these dependent variables. It shows that the 
average share of statements supporting the selected countries ranges from 0.42% of all US 
statements to 0.95% of all Chinese statements. These small numbers are driven by the fact 
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that the most common behavior for most countries is not to react at all on other countries’ 
statements. However, some individual countries have lent considerable support to some 
others. Most prominently, some countries have explicitly expressed support for about 20% 
of the statements made by India or China.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
As we are interested in the effect of Annex I (or non-Annex I) membership on these 
supportive statements, our central independent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 
if a country is listed in Annex I of the Convention (data obtained from UNFCCC, 2010b).  
The effect of this variable can be easily confounded with the effect of a number of country 
characteristics that simultaneously influence country preferences and Annex I or non-
Annex I membership. The most prominent variables to be considered are those that capture 
the intentions behind the construction of Annex I, namely a differentiated treatment 
depending on income and emissions: the UNFCCC’s principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” implies that countries should 
mitigate climate change in line with their contribution to the problem (emissions) and with 
their capability to act (income) (Gupta, 2010). Income is expressed in terms of GNI per 
capita, as the per capita measure better incorporates the notion of equity and fairness entailed 
in the Convention’s principles than overall income. For emissions we try two specifications, 
total CO2 emissions and CO2 emissions per capita, because there are different theoretical 
arguments regarding which of these measures should be used (Bakker et al., 2009; 
Karousakis et al., 2008; Ott et al., 2004). The data comes from UNFCCC (2010a), 
UNSTATS (2010) and World Bank (2009).  
In addition, we consider a large number of variables that capture other potentially relevant 
country characteristics. Country size (in terms of population) and education (measured as net 
secondary enrollment) are used to capture realist ideas on the role of a country’s power 
resources and bargaining skills in influencing the negotiations (Keohane and Nye, 1989; 
Mastenbroek, 1991; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Steinberg, 2002). Data are from the World 
Bank (2009). Three other variables model more specifically the delegation’s negotiation 
skills: dummy variables indicating whether the country’s national or official language is 
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English or French because language is frequently considered a barrier for communication 
and understanding during these technically complex negotiations; the number of 
memberships to international agreements as an indicator of the country’s experience and 
activity in other international negotiations; and the number of oral interventions during the 
UNFCCC negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009 as a direct measure of 
activity within the climate regime. Data on language was obtained from Lewis (2009); 
membership to international organizations is from the Correlates of War Dataset on 
International Organizations, version 2.3 (Pevehouse et al., 2004); oral interventions were 
coded from IISD (2007-2009). 
Measures of political freedom and government ideology (left-right) are used to control for 
the possible effect of ideological influences on country positions and negotiation behavior 
(for example, left-wing Latin American administrations such as Bolivia and Venezuela tend 
to use the UNFCCC as a forum to disassociate themselves from what they consider 
neoliberal imperialism – see Vihma (2010)). Data was obtained from Freedom House (2008) 
and the Database of Political Institutions 2010 (Beck et al., 2001).  
Two indicators of vulnerability to climate change (the composite Environmental 
Vulnerability Index, and income from agriculture in % of GDP) as well as characteristics 
related to potential benefits from specific areas under discussion (such as the use of carbon 
markets, forest cover, the use of renewable energy, or the amount of coal and oil exported by 
a country) are also included to control for issue-specific interests of parties. Data are from 
SOPAC (2010), World Bank (2009), UNEP Risoe Centre (2010), FAO (2005), US Energy 
Information Administration (2010) and UN Comtrade (2010), respectively. 
Finally, we consider the role of bilateral political and/or economic relationships in other 
areas such as aid, trade, colonial past or voting in the UN General Assembly (Barbieri and 
Keshk, 2010; Barbieri et al., 2009; Baumann et al., 2013; DAC, 2007; Dreher, 2008), as 
these variables might influence the relationships of parties in the climate regime and thus 
their behavior in terms of agreeing with other parties’ positions.  
If not otherwise indicated, all of these variables are measured for the year 2007, the start of 
the coding period for our dependent variables. Since country coalitions are included as single 
observations along individual countries, we generate values for the respective variables by 
using the averages of their member countries. Only in the case of population, which is 
included to represent a country’s power, we use the sum to reflect the overall size of the 
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coalition. The data is generally complete. For a few variables, we replace some missing 
values by linear imputation using related indicators (such as gross secondary enrolment to 
impute for net secondary enrolment).  
Table 2 compares the country characteristics of Annex I and non-Annex I countries on the 
basis of key selected controls. Table A2 in the Supplementary Material presents a more 
complete description of all variables, their descriptive statistics and data sources. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
On average, Annex I and non-Annex I countries do indeed differ on many characteristics 
that may be relevant for their preferences and their statements in the negotiations. As 
expected, on average, Annex I countries are considerably more advanced economically and 
in terms of education. They also tend to be more democratic as indicated by a considerably 
lower Freedom House index. Emission levels are higher, and vulnerability to climate change 
is less prevalent. Annex I countries also tend to be members of more international 
agreements and participate more actively in the UNFCCC discussions.  
Despite all these differences in means, the range of values for these variables indicates that 
there is a wide overlap between Annex I and non-Annex I. Within Annex I, GNI per capita 
for instance, ranges from 6 830$ (PPP) for Ukraine to 107 549$ for Liechtenstein. Within 
non-Annex I, it ranges from 280$ for Liberia to 78 851$ for Qatar. While the poorest non-
Annex I countries and the richest Annex I countries do not find an appropriate match, a 
number of countries have incomes that are comparable between the two groups. The same is 
true for all other variables in Table 2.  
All in all, this comparison highlights the importance of an appropriate control for these 
factors in our empirical estimation. Moreover, it indicates that the overlap between both 
groups should be strong enough to allow us to refine the estimation strategy by matching a 
set of truly comparable countries, in order to test the robustness of our results. 
 
5. Estimation methods  
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In order to test the effect of Annex I membership we first run multivariate regressions 
controlling for the context variables described above. We use a tobit model to take into 
account that the percentage of supportive statements is censored at zero. While theoretically 
the dependent variable is also censored at 100, all our observations are well below this 
threshold, so that we do not need to account for censoring from above. In a second step, we 
use propensity score matching to test the robustness of our results. 
In principle, the advantage of regression analysis is that we get an impression of the effect of 
our control variables, along with our explanatory variable, so that we can get an idea of the 
plausibility of the model as a whole. Unfortunately, correlations between the different right 
hand side variables are very high (see Table A3 in the Supplementary Material) so that we 
can make sense of the coefficients only when we avoid entering too many variables at once. 
Since all of the considered variables appear theoretically relevant as controls we revert to a 
mechanical forward selection procedure including all variables with p-values ≤ 0.2. Only our 
central dummy variable for Annex I membership is included per default, independently of 
this threshold.  
A further problem with the regression analysis may be undue extrapolation that leads us to 
compare countries that are not really fully comparable. As discussed above, a number of 
countries within Annex I and non-Annex I do not find appropriate matches in the other 
group and regression results may be problematic if they are driven by these observations. In 
addition, the preoccupation with multicollinearity may lead us to omit relevant control 
variables thereby trading off the unbiased coefficients of the Annex I dummy against the 
overall interpretability of regression results. And finally, besides the assumptions of 
normality of residuals and homoscedasticity, which are critical for the tobit to be consistent, 
regression analysis also presupposes a linear relationship between the percentage of 
supportive statements and the right hand side variables while our theoretical framework 
provides no indication that the relationship should necessarily be linear. 
To take these issues into account, we also proceed with a nonparametric matching analysis. 
We consider Annex I membership as a “treatment” D to which the country (or coalition) is 
subjected. The empirical strategy attempts to select other countries as controls that 
correspond in their characteristics to those countries that received the treatment. If all 
variables X simultaneously influencing the decision about which country is part of Annex I 
(the treatment) and the share of supportive statements (the outcome) are taken into account, 
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the “selection on observables” (Heckman and Robb, 1985) or “conditional independence” 
assumption (Lechner, 1999) is satisfied and the impact of Annex I membership can be 
identified.  
As demonstrated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the estimation of the treatment effect can 
be facilitated if the information incorporated in the relevant control variables is first 
projected into a single variable, the propensity score p(x)=P(D=1|X=x). If matching on X is 
consistent, matching with respect to the propensity score p(x) is consistent as well. The 
multidimensional problem of matching on X is thereby reduced to the one-dimensional 
problem of matching on p(X). The propensity score is estimated by a probit regression of the 
binary treatment variable “Annex I membership” on X.  
The control variables X are selected on the basis of the common relevance for selection into 
Annex I and for supportive statements. The latter is based on the results of the tobit model. 
To ensure that the conditional independence assumption is satisfied, we also look at the 
correlates of Annex I. Just as in the case of the tobit regressions, we do so by first identifying 
a large number of theoretically plausible variables which we then reduce to a smaller number 
running a mechanical statistical selection procedure, setting the cut-off at a p-value of 20%, 
and carrying out both, forward and backward selection eventually using all variables that 
have been included in either of the two. In addition, we include some variables that appear 
particularly pertinent from the tobit regressions. 
For the estimation of the conditional expectation function we use nearest neighbor matching 
with the five nearest neighbors, this is, we compare each observation for an Annex I country, 
with the five non-Annex I observations that have the most similar propensity score, and vice 
versa. We opt for nearest neighbor matching because this algorithm generated the matches 
with the lowest differences between treated and untreated countries. 
 
6. The impact of Annex I membership: Results 
Table 3 presents the results for the parsimonious regressions relying on the limited set of 
control variables selected as discussed above. Numbers represent the marginal effects 
estimated at the means of the sample, i.e.: 
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 ,      with yij=0 if xij’bj + uij ≤ 0, and yij =xij’bj+uij otherwise, 
 
whereby xij denotes the vector of right hand side variables for country i in regression j 
(considering the statements by country i in support of the positions of country j), bj is the 
vector of parameter estimates in regression j, and uij is the corresponding error term. In 
Tables B2-B3 of the Supplementary Material, we also report marginal effects for strictly 
positive values of yij. Such marginal effects show the effect of our explanatory variables on 
the percentage of statements supporting country j by those countries i that at least expressed 
such support once. In these models the observed relationships are even stronger than in 
Table 3, both substantively and in terms of statistical significance. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 shows that even after controlling for a number of relevant control variables, 
membership to Annex I remains significant in seven out of nine regressions. The direction of 
the effect of membership to Annex I is as expected: coefficients are positive for the EU, 
USA and Russia, and negative for the Alliance of Small Island States, the African Group, 
Tuvalu, China, India and Saudi Arabia. This implies that, after controlling for country 
characteristics that may make their preferences and positions similar, Annex I members 
more frequently support other Annex I members (EU, USA and Russia), but less frequently 
support those countries or coalitions that are not part of Annex I (all the others). The size of 
the coefficients is substantial in several cases. For example, the expected percentage of 
statements supporting Russia is about 4 percentage points larger for Annex I countries than 
for non-Annex I countries. This corresponds to about two standard deviations. The EU is 
supported 48% of a standard deviation more frequently by Annex I than by non-Annex I 
countries. In the case of the Alliance of Small Island States, the African Group, Tuvalu, 
China and India, the percentage of supportive statements is between 15 and 24% of a 
standard deviation smaller for Annex I than for non-Annex I countries. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, both the size of the coefficient and the statistical significance indicate that there is no 
important effect of being in Annex I. This is in line with the observation that Saudi Arabia 
ij
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frequently blocks progress in the negotiations, and thus neither Annex I nor most non-
Annex I countries usually support its views.  
The signs of our central control variables correspond to what we should expect: Countries 
who generally intervene more frequently in the negotiation process also do so more 
frequently in support of other countries’ arguments. English speaking, larger countries and 
countries with better education and more participation in international organizations also 
tend to make more supportive statements (in the case of the small island states, the negative 
effect of education may be related to a high support by other poor and vulnerable countries, 
such as the least developed countries, which also display low levels of education). French 
speaking countries tend to make fewer supportive statements, likely due to language barriers. 
The fact that countries with more CO2 emissions appear to show more support for the non-
Annex I countries in our sample may be related to the fact that the largest emitter – China – 
belongs itself to non-Annex I.  
We also observe that more democratic countries tend to support the EU’s opinions more, but 
also those of the Alliance of Small Island States and Tuvalu. This may be related with public 
opinion in these countries expressing concern about the effects of climate change on small 
island states. More vulnerable countries lend less support to the EU and Russia, probably 
due to their – in the view of vulnerable countries – insufficient commitment towards deeper 
emission cuts. Countries with a high share of renewable energy tend to lend less support to 
China, India and Saudi Arabia, which is not surprising, since these are mainly European and 
other Annex I countries. It is also interesting that the variable measuring agreement with the 
US in the UN General Assembly, which is highly correlated with our Annex I dummy, has a 
large negative effect on support for China and Saudi Arabia, but that at least for China, the 
effect of Annex I is still noticeable and significant.  
Thus, overall, the results of the regressions appear reasonable and increase our confidence in 
the model as a whole and in the selected controls. A table with results for the complete set of 
control variables is provided for comparison in the Supplementary Material (Table B1). 
Wald and likelihood ratio tests let us conclude that the inclusion of further variables does not 
substantially improve the regression fit. Due to the strong multicollinearity, many variables 
become insignificant individually. However, our most relevant variable indicating the effect 
of Annex I membership is still significant (with the expected sign) in six of the regressions.  
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Robustness checks included using total GDP instead of total population and CO2 emissions 
per capita instead of total emissions, and generating the population value for the country 
coalitions using the mean rather than the sum. We also tried dropping the country coalitions 
from the dataset; taking logs from the dependent variable and from the variables number of 
interventions, population and CO2 emissions to account for skewness; using factor analysis 
to simplify our set of independent variables instead of the forward selection procedure 
described above; and transforming the main control variables into Euclidean distances. Our 
theory provides no indication of the functional form of the effect of country preferences on 
the amount of supportive statements made. So far, we have assumed a linear relationship. It 
could also be the case that a measure of distance between the preferences of the supporting 
country and those of the supported country is more appropriate. This would take into account 
the fact that countries with significantly less emissions than, say, India may have opinions as 
different to it as countries with significantly more emissions. This new measure of distance 
is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between country i’s and country j’s value 
for each of the original control variables (with the exception of the variables that were used 
to represent bargaining ability). The results for our main explanatory variable, Annex I, 
remain robust to these different specifications, and are available on request.  
Hence the tobit regressions clearly indicate a role of Annex I versus non-Annex I 
membership that holds over and above the influence of relevant country characteristics. 
When we use propensity score matching as a final robustness check that avoids the 
limitations of regression analysis described in the previous section, this general result 
remains the same. Results of the probit estimation of the propensity score are presented in 
Table B4 of the Supplementary Material. Table 4 presents the comparison of means for 
different relevant characteristics of Annex I and non-Annex I members before and after the 
matching procedure. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
This highly convincing matching result does, however, come at a cost. To compare only 
those countries that are comparable at all, we impose common support, i.e., we delete all 
observations from the dataset that were outside the range of characteristics for the 
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comparison group. Table 5 shows that the actual number of countries that are eventually 
used in our analysis thereby shrinks considerably to about 39. Moreover, we had to exclude 
two potentially important variables: number of interventions and voting with the US at the 
UN General Assembly. As soon as No. of interventions is included in the analysis, the 
matching procedure is unable to find convincing matches. This may be problematic as the 
number of interventions is clearly important as a determinant of supportive statements. At 
the same time, it was generally not significant in the probit regressions we estimated to find 
the most appropriate equation for the propensity score, as soon as the other variables were 
controlled for. In addition, there are no theoretical reasons why the current number of 
interventions in the negotiations should be important for selection into Annex I (which took 
place in 1992). The variable voting at the UN General Assembly has several missing values 
among countries within Annex I, which results in an even smaller common support during 
the matching procedure. However, it was found to be significant only for supportive 
statements with Saudi Arabia (see Table 3), and we do not have any theoretical reason why 
voting behavior in the general assembly should influence selection into Annex I. We 
therefore believe that the conditional independence assumption is satisfied even without 
inclusion of these variables as controls.  
Since Annex I and non-Annex I countries differ in a number of characteristics, the effect of 
having been selected as an Annex I country (average treatment effect on the treated) and the 
effect of being selected among current non-Annex I countries (average treatment effect on 
the untreated) may be different so that it may be interesting to look at both. The results of 
our nonparametric matching estimator for both the average treatment effect on the treated 
and on the untreated are presented in Table 5. The matching analysis was carried out using 
the Stata module prepared by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Our results show that, at least for statements in support of some countries (Russia, African 
Group, Tuvalu, India and Saudi Arabia) either the average treatment effect on the treated or 
the average treatment effect on the untreated (or both) are significant. In some other cases, 
the estimates are close to significant at the 10% level (for example, the average treatment 
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effect on the treated for the Alliance of Small Island States, with a t-value of 1.46, and the 
average treatment effect on the untreated for Saudi Arabia, with a t-value of 1.63). Even for 
a very restricted set of comparable countries, and when comparing each country only to 
those countries that are the most similar in all relevant country characteristics, it appears that 
the effect of Annex I membership cannot be neglected. All significant treatment effects are 
sizeable and show the expected sign. With 5.4 percentage points, the average treatment 
effect on the treated corresponds to 2.8 standard deviations of the support for Russia, and 
with -2.9%, the average treatment effect on the treated corresponds to 1.4 standard 
deviations of support for India. In the other cases with significant treatment effects, these 
correspond to 50-100% of the standard deviations. Even in cases where the effect is not 
statistically significant, it is sizable: in the EU and USA, the average treatment effect on the 
treated corresponds to 1.2 and 0.8 standard deviations of support, respectively. Thus, while 
the matching exercise – through the reduction in the number of observations – led to lower 
levels of significance, the estimated impacts are even higher than in the tobit regressions.  
This implies that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I membership has indeed been 
responsible for some of the negotiation dynamics observed during the UNFCCC 
negotiations. Since, at given country characteristics, Annex I countries tend to support other 
Annex I countries, while non-Annex I countries tend to support them less, the mere existence 
of the split between Annex I and non-Annex I seems to have amplified the existing divide 
between developing and industrialized countries. More generally, this implies that the 
creation of new country groups within an international negotiation process has institutional 
consequences that require some in-depth reflection. Short-term agreements found via 
differential treatment of specific country groups may come at a cost during later negotiation 
rounds.  
 
6. Conclusions, policy recommendations, and perspectives for further research 
International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying 
differentiated rules and commitments that may, in turn, generate new negotiation dynamics. 
We propose a theoretical explanation for such dynamics through our “constructed peer group 
hypothesis” and advance two complementary theoretical arguments in its support, namely 
new incentives and socialization.  
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Our empirical analysis does not allow us to distinguish between these two causal 
mechanisms. However, it allows us to present a first systematic test of the idea that state 
interests and negotiation behavior within an intergovernmental organization are influenced 
by this form of institutional design. Looking at constructed groups of countries with 
heterogeneous preferences allows us to disentangle this peer group effect from the effect of 
similarities in initial preferences. 
Empirically, using multivariate tobit regressions and propensity score matching, we find 
that, over and above the ex-ante differences in country characteristics and preferences, the 
split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries has indeed influenced negotiation behavior 
in the UNFCCC and thereby amplified the existing divide between developing and 
industrialized countries. The deliberate creation of new country groups in the institutional 
design of the UNFCCC has thus had long-term consequences for the future development of 
the negotiations within the organization. This confirms some of the results of earlier, more 
descriptive studies of the climate regime. More generally, this provides some initial 
empirical support of our constructed peer group hypothesis, and thereby the idea of path 
dependence for negotiation structures and dynamics.  
These results imply that, in the future, paying more attention to institutional design could 
strengthen intergovernmental organizations’ contribution to achieving their goals within the 
international community. If initial differentiation is necessary to achieve an agreement in the 
first place, this differentiation should be institutionalized in a way that minimizes detrimental 
effects on future developments. In this context, differentiation on the basis of clear criteria 
and the specification of transparent ‘graduation rules’ should be preferred to rigid country 
lists. Our results thus confirm Rajamani (2006) conceptual argument that differential 
treatment needs to work within a controlled framework, in which it does not obstruct the 
general purpose of the treaty, but responds to real differences across countries and ceases to 
exist when these differences cease to exist. At the same time, it may be helpful to establish 
institutional structures that channel the formal and informal negotiations in an open, 
transparent and inclusive way, and to build bridges between different groups.  
Which of the above policy recommendations are most conducive to effective and dynamic 
intergovernmental organizations also depends, at least to some extent, on whether the 
socialization or the new incentives effect is the main driver of the constructed peer group 
hypothesis. It may be worthwhile to explore these questions in further research based on 
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time series data. To reach stronger and more general conclusions, further research could also 
compare the case of the UNFCCC to other intergovernmental organizations. Since 
differential treatment has become a relatively common feature of international treaties even 
beyond the environmental domain, future research could explore the variation in the 
specifications of this provision across institutional arrangements to deduce more concrete 
advice for effective intergovernmental organizations. Together with an extension of this 
study to account for potentially changing effects over time, for possible differences across 
issue areas within a regime, and for a larger set of country dyads, this would provide an 
important test of the reliability and validity of our results and bring us a significant step 
forward in the analysis of successful institutional design. Through the theoretical description 
of the constructed peer group effect, and its first concrete estimation in the context of the 
UNFCCC, this paper thus opens up a number of interesting avenues for future research.  
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Table 1: Statements declaring support for selected countries’ positions (as % of their 
number of interventions) 
Percentage of 
statements supporting: Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
USA 173 0.42 1.60 0 10.50 
Tuvalu 173 0.44 1.09 0 7.14 
EU 173 0.45 1.35 0 8.89 
AOSIS 173 0.53 1.43 0 10.39 
Russia 173 0.55 1.95 0 12.86 
African Group 173 0.60 1.77 0 12.12 
Saudi Arabia 173 0.63 1.71 0 15.42 
India 173 0.70 2.05 0 20.00 
China 173 0.95 2.62 0 20.68 
Note: Countries / coalitions sorted by mean support. AOSIS stands for the Alliance of Small Island States. 
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Table 2: Comparing country characteristics for Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
 Annex I Non-Annex I 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Country size, political and economic development  
Population 114.60 196.43 0.03 680.10 97.29 578.76 0.002 6861.37 
GDP 1.68 3.48 0.004 14.00 0.09 0.33 0 3.4 
GNI per capita 33.57 23.84 6.83 107.55 7.81 11.36 0.28 78.85 
Freedom House index 1.96 1.64 1 6.50 3.77 1.79 1 7.00 
Education 88.17 8.71 69.50 103.11 57.83 22.88 2.6 104.54 
Emissions  
CO2 emissions 0.77 1.48 0.002 5.80 0.10 0.55 0.000004 6.5 
CO2 emissions per capita 9.92 4.79 3.91 19.28 3.94 8.24 0.02 76.80 
 
Vulnerability 
 
Agriculture 4.91 3.58 0 12.20 17.89 14.70 0 76.90 
Vulnerability 3.60 0.72 2.73 5.50 3.33 0.77 1.67 5.13 
Vulnerability per GDP 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.57 1.61 2.90 0.04 29.72 
Factors of interest for specific areas under discussion  
Carbon markets 0.28 0.98 0 4.04 0.05 0.32 0 4.03 
Forests 0.30 0.17 0 0.68 0.29 0.24 0 0.95 
Renewables 0.25 0.33 0 1.03 0.02 0.12 0 1.18 
 
Negotiation experience and activity 
 
Intl. agreements  70.89 21.69 20 99.00 56.88 17.18 16 95.00 
No. of interventions  133.82 149.99 0 540 23.32 54.40 0 382 
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Table 3: Determinants of supportive statements (in %)  
Support for: EU USA Russia AOSIS African 
Group 
Tuvalu China India Saudi Arabia 
Annex I 0.646 ** 0.362   3.969 *** -0.215 *** -0.322 *** -0.211 *** -0.538 *** -0.497 *** -0.183   
No of interventions 0.005 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 * 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 0.015 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 
Population -0.000 *** -0.000  -0.000  0.000 *** 0.000 * -0.000 * 0.000 *** -0.000 *   
GNI per capita 0.003    -0.004 *           0.015 *** 
Education 0.002    0.002  -0.005 **           
English language 0.145 ** 0.061                
French language             -0.351 *** -0.412 *** -0.276 *** 
Intl. agreements   0.001    0.006 **     0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.009 ** 
CO2 emissions       0.231 *** 0.306 *** 0.088 * 1.157 *** 0.645 *** 0.498 *** 
Freedom House -0.028 * -0.010    -0.080 ***   -0.092 ***       
Right government                   
Left government             0.196    0.287 ** 
Agriculture                   
Vulnerability -0.123 ***   -0.030              
UNGA voting 0.417            -1.947    -3.353 *** 
Colony                   
Fossil exports             1.029      
Forests     -0.238 *   0.405  0.244      -0.488 * 
Renewables 0.235    -0.214        -1.436 ** -0.697 * -0.808 * 
Carbon markets       0.155    0.118  0.275 * 0.258 *   
Aid from the EU                   
Aid from USA   -3.309 **               
Observations 155   154   155   155   155   155   155   155   145   
Left censored 103  122  135  107  113  115  96  101  93  
Log likelihood -89  -63  -60  -115  -137  -103  -142  -146  -123  
Pseudo R2 0.475   0.525   0.423   0.355   0.209   0.317   0.390   0.298   0.355   
Notes: Tobit regressions, values are for marginal effects, with yij=0 if xi’b + ui ≤ 0, and yij =xi’b+ui otherwise. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Constant not reported. For 
variable descriptions, see Table A2 in the Supplementary Material. AOSIS stands for the Alliance of Small 
Island States; UNGA stands for the UN General Assembly. 
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Table 4: Comparison of means before and after matching 
Variable 
 
Sample 
 
Mean 
Treated  Control 
%bias 
 
% reduct 
|bias| 
t-test 
t        p>|t| 
GNI per capita Unmatched 28.64 7.47 168.60  6.87 0.00 
 Matched 18.60 17.03 12.50 92.60 0.22 0.83 
GDP Unmatched 1.79 0.09 67.00  5.64 0.00 
 Matched 0.43 0.58 -5.60 91.60 -0.33 0.75 
CO2 emissions Unmatched 9.92 3.78 90.60  2.81 0.01 
per capita Matched 8.55 8.11 6.40 92.90 0.11 0.92 
CO2 emissions Unmatched 0.77 0.10 60.30  3.59 0.00 
 Matched 0.37 0.70 -29.60 50.90 -0.44 0.67 
Education Unmatched 87.67 57.28 175.00  5.08 0.00 
 Matched 82.58 79.79 16.10 90.80 0.55 0.59 
English language Unmatched 0.40 0.39 2.80  0.10 0.92 
 Matched 0.14 0.09 11.50 -314.30 0.31 0.76 
French language Unmatched 0.20 0.23 -6.60  -0.24 0.81 
 Matched 0.00 0.06 -13.70 -107.10 -0.60 0.56 
Vulnerability Unmatched 3.41 3.30 17.90  0.57 0.57 
 Matched 3.36 3.29 10.50 41.00 0.18 0.86 
Renewables Unmatched 0.27 0.03 95.30  5.84 0.00 
 Matched 0.08 0.09 -2.10 97.80 -0.04 0.97 
Intl. agreements Unmatched 76.75 58.01 120.10  4.25 0.00 
 Matched 67.29 72.34 -32.40 73.00 -0.58 0.57 
For variable descriptions, see Table A2 in the Supplementary Material.  
Values between Table 2 and Table 4 may differ due to missing values in some of the variables used in the 
matching procedure. 
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Table 5: Estimation results of propensity score matching 
% of supportive ATT  ATU  off support on support 
votes for:   untreated treated untreated treated 
EU 1.606  0.315  115 6 31 8 
USA 1.273  0.446  114 7 32 7 
Russia 5.388 *** 5.503 *** 119 7 27 7 
AOSIS -0.903  -0.406  113 8 32 7 
African Group -1.169 * -0.554  113 8 32 7 
Tuvalu -0.975 ** -0.521 * 113 8 32 7 
China -1.429  -1.142  114 8 31 7 
India -2.885 ** -1.567 ** 113 8 32 7 
Saudi Arabia -1.787 * -1.170  113 8 32 7 
Notes: Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. AOSIS stands for 
the Alliance of Small Island States; ATT stands for the average treatment effect on the treated; ATU stands for 
the average treatment effect on the untreated. 
 
 
 
